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DANIEL A. MORRIS
Religion in the Age of Trump 
I teach and write about volatile 
political topics. My training 
is in religious studies. Within 
that broad discipline, I work at 
the intersection of Christian 
ethics, American religious 
history, and democratic politics. 
The “democratic” part of my 
work means that I focus on 
“the people,” especially as 
they are included or excluded from their own governance. 
Here at Augustana College, the classes I teach that deal 
most directly with these issues are: “Race, Ethnicity, and 
Religion;” “Sexual Ethics;” and “American Christianities.” I 
love teaching these classes; it is a tremendous privilege and 
uniquely fulfilling to introduce undergraduates to ongoing 
conversations with obvious contemporary relevance. 
It’s hard, though, to know whether and how to allow 
my own political voice into the classroom. I am firmly 
committed to a pedagogical model that empowers 
students to inform themselves about political debates and 
stake out their own positions within them. I consider it an 
abuse of my power in the classroom to persuade students 
on religious, moral, or political questions. Also, objectivity 
is presumably an important value in scholarly inquiry. I feel 
an obligation to model objectivity within the classroom, 
even (or especially) when dealing with divisive topics. And 
yet, complete objectivity is obviously not possible. I make 
choices to include, exclude, and emphasize certain voices 
when constructing and revising the syllabus, for example, 
and we all make moral judgments, even in the classroom, 
about politics, religion, and America’s history of racial 
and sexual oppression. I have never heard anyone call for 
strict objectivity in discussions of the transatlantic slave 
trade, and yet for some reason teachers are expected to 
maintain moral neutrality when discussing the murders of 
Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, and others. In 
recent years I have also come to the painful realization that 
students of color, LGBTQ+ students, and Muslim students 
often perceive academic objectivity in the classroom as a 
glaring lack of support. To make this pedagogical difficulty 
worse, the murmuring public perception that academics 
shamelessly promote political liberalism was recently 
turned up to 11 when Betsy DeVos, the United States 
Secretary of Education, stated that “faculty, from adjunct 
professors to deans,” tell students “what to do, what to 
say, and more ominously, what to think” (Jaschik).
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“I have also come to the painful realization 
that students of color, LGBTQ+ students, 
and Muslim students often perceive 
academic objectivity in the classroom  
as a glaring lack of support.”
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I will likely never stop thinking about what objectivity 
means in the context of teaching classes at the nexus of 
religion, ethics, politics, race, and sexuality. I am certain, 
though, that my political activism and my scholarly activity 
must now inform each other more than they did before 
Donald Trump won the Electoral College vote in November, 
2016. I am both a scholar of religion and politics, and a 
political actor in our democratic experiment. I cannot 
ultimately separate these two roles. And now, under 
the Trump presidency, I feel called to bring them closer 
together. If I don’t make my research and writing active in 
civic life, I will fail in my responsibilities to empower the 
oppressed and restrain the forces that would dominate 
them. If I leave my political vision completely out of the 
classroom, I will fail in my responsibility to show students 
how high and asymmetrical the stakes are in debates 
about religion, politics, race, and sex. As I watch Trump’s 
policies and rhetoric tear families apart, abandon the 
poor, and strike fear in the marginalized, I am convinced 
that my scholarship and political action must inform each 
other more directly than they had before. Other scholars 
who feel this pull must determine for themselves where 
their expertise and political passions meet. For me, at this 
moment, they coalesce around one main question: what is 
the role of religion in Trump’s America?
As I think about this question, my mind turns immedi-
ately to evangelical politics and the status of Islam. If you 
are reading Intersections, you are likely aware that 80% 
of evangelicals voted for Trump in this election. I want to 
reflect on that statistic within historical contexts of evan-
gelicalism in American politics, and I want to suggest the 
following two theses: (1) evangelicals’ standard conception 
of Godly participation in political life has lost the coherence 
it once had; and (2) evangelicals’ historical tendency to 
exclude others from political life has now become directed 
at Muslims. Telling a story with these two theses at its 
heart is one way in which my scholarship and activism 
mutually inform each other.
This story must begin by noting that evangelicals have 
believed consistently throughout American history that 
their religion has a very important role to play in political 
life. The Puritans believed that God had led them away from 
the repressive political and religious climate of England, 
where their vision of church and government was not 
being accepted, toward New England, where they could 
establish their own Godly society. A Calvinist style church 
was at the center of Puritan society and politics. Leaders 
of this community, especially John Winthrop, insisted that 
the Puritan faith and practice was absolutely necessary 
for New England’s political society to thrive. According to 
Winthrop and others, God had selected Puritans to lead 
England and the world by showing everyone that the perfect 
society is one with this specific church and set of religious 
beliefs at its center. Winthrop likened the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony to a “city on a hill” in his famous sermon, “A 
Model of Christian Charity,” which he preached aboard 
the Arbella. His reference was biblical; he was drawing on 
Matthew 5, which attributes these words to Jesus: “You are 
the light of the world. A city built on a hill cannot be hid. No 
one after lighting a lamp puts it under the bushel basket, 
but on the lampstand, and it gives light to all in the house. 
In the same way, let your light shine before others, so that 
they may see your good works and give glory to your Father 
in heaven” (Matt 5:14-16). This vision imagined the Puritan 
experiment as a model for the entire world to follow, which 
is the origin of the “exceptionalist” tendencies in American 
evangelicalism. The Puritans thought of themselves as 
“exceptional” because they offered a moment of Godly 
discontinuity from typical human religious and political 
activity. The fate of America’s political experiment (to say 
nothing of humanity’s relation with God) depended upon the 
nation following this exceptional example. American evan-
gelicals have maintained this sense of exceptionalism down 
to today, believing that their particular religious and moral 
vision was necessary as a grounding for American civic 
life. By our standards today, Puritan society was theocratic: 
“As I watch Trump’s policies and rhetoric tear 
families apart, abandon the poor, and strike 
fear in the marginalized, I am convinced 
that my scholarship and political action 
must inform each other more directly than 
they had before.”
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church power coincided with civic power, many forms of 
religious belief were not tolerated, and so forth. Roger 
Williams was exiled from Massachusetts Bay Colony partly 
because he critiqued Puritanism and began moving toward 
separatism. The example of the Puritans, then, shows 
us two important historical tendencies in evangelicals’ 
political activity: they have believed that their religion must 
guide American politics, and they have excluded others as 
part of that belief.
Evangelicals’ participation in politics has ebbed and 
flowed throughout American history. They were highly 
engaged in political life in the early nineteenth century, 
bringing their religious beliefs to questions about temper-
ance, dueling, and the morality of slavery. In each case, 
they believed that their religious morality needed to shape 
policy or else American civilization would fail. This is the 
basic tenet of evangelical belief that the United States is 
a “Christian nation.” As they turned toward premillen-
nialism after the Civil War, they started to invest less in 
civic life. The Scopes Trial of 1925 sent many evangelicals 
retreating into a sub-culture, further away from political 
life than before. Then, in the mid-1970s, evangelicals came 
storming back into politics in a major way, through the 
formation of the Religious Right, a coalition of conservative 
evangelicals who resisted the perceived liberalism of the 
counter-culture, the sexual revolution, the Supreme Court 
ruling in Roe v. Wade, and the civil rights movement. This 
coalition has shaped evangelicals’ engagement of politics 
from the late 1970s to today. The Religious Right is the 
primary reason why evangelicals tend to embrace political 
conservatism in America, although, as I will explain 
shortly, the religious fervor behind this embrace lacks the 
coherence it once had.
Just as evangelicals’ engagement of politics has waxed 
and waned, so too has their social and political exclusivity 
changed over the years. After the ratification of the First 
Amendment in 1791, evangelicals accepted, however 
grudgingly, the fact that the federal government would not 
support, sanction, or mandate any specific religion. (Even 
though on the state level, Connecticut and Massachusetts 
didn’t disestablish the Congregationalist church until 
well into the nineteenth century.) While they didn’t usually 
try to explicitly or overtly dismantle the wall of separa-
tion, evangelicals did continue to believe that, because 
their religious and moral vision was divinely inspired, 
other groups should not be allowed full participation and 
inclusion in our democratic experiment. 
One obvious example of this belief is how evangeli-
cals thought about black Americans in the nineteenth 
century. Writers like George Armstrong argued that 
slaves should not be freed because they were inherently 
inferior to the more civilized race of white people, that 
God had made the races in such a hierarchy that a Godly 
social order would reflect that, and that slavery actually 
protected such an inferior race from being destroyed by 
their superiors on a level political playing field. Evangelical 
abolitionists weren’t much better in their assumptions 
about racial superiority and inferiority. Evangelicals have 
harbored deep suspicions about Catholics, too. They 
regarded Catholic immigration in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as a clear threat to the moral 
and political stability of the nation. Their perceptions of 
Catholic drinking, superstitious ritual, and deference to 
papal authority made evangelicals believe that Catholics 
could not participate well in American democracy. Such 
assumptions persisted well into the twentieth century. 
When John F. Kennedy made his case for the presidency, 
he faced evangelical pearl-clutching about whether a 
Catholic could govern the country effectively, and what a 
Catholic in the White House might mean for our collec-
tive identity as a Christian nation. These are just a few 
examples of evangelicals’ tendency toward political 
exclusion, which is the flip side of the claim that evangeli-
cals must have a privileged place in United States politics.
Now, on to Trump. What is the status of evangelical 
participation in politics today, after the 2016 presidential 
election? One answer to this question is that evangelicals 
“American evangelicals have maintained 
this sense of exceptionalism down to today, 
believing that their particular religious and 
moral vision was necessary as a grounding 
for American civic life.”
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are still engaged in American politics, and their engage-
ment generally follows the model of the Religious Right, 
which has been the norm since the 1970s. However, the 
religious story on which their political activity is built is not 
nearly as coherent or compelling as it once was. Back in 
the 1970s, politically conservative evangelicals could tell a 
story about how God desired an orderly society, leavened 
by the religious morality of born again Christians. That 
orderly society, they thought, would properly acknowl-
edge differences between sexes, respect authority, value 
life, and resist government interference in church and 
market. Whether you think that story has merit or not, at 
least it was coherent and consistent with some premises 
developed from Christian sources like the Bible. 
Things were different in 2016. There was no coherent 
story motivating evangelical support for Trump. Trump 
spoke awkwardly, at best, about his own religion. He has 
been divorced twice, and divorce has always been a major 
moral concern for evangelicals. He doesn’t have clear 
positions on the basic political issues that have motivated 
politically conservative Christians since the 1970s, such as 
abortion or same-sex marriage, and on and on. (Of course, 
the disconnect between Trump and politically liberal 
Christianities is even greater. Trump’s disregard for “the 
least of these” makes him an even worse fit with politically 
liberal Christianities, but that’s not the point I’m trying to 
make.) The poor fit between Trump and evangelicals is 
likely a major reason why he selected Mike Pence as his 
running mate. The “normal” connection between political 
figures and conservative evangelical voters simply was 
not there. And yet, they voted for him. Overwhelmingly. 
Eric Metaxas, a prominent evangelical writer, argued that 
evangelicals should actively vote for Trump—not abstain 
from voting or vote for a third party, but actually vote for 
Trump—because he was anxious about Hillary Clinton’s 
ability to shape the Supreme Court, her private email 
server, the support she gets from Planned Parenthood, 
and so on. (Metaxas) His reasoning is thin and tortured. It 
is nothing like the robust story that grounded the work of 
the Religious Right in the 1970s. In the era of Trump, evan-
gelicals are voting by inertia, without a clear and coherent 
story about why they engage in politics the way they do. 
A second answer to the question, “What is the status 
of evangelical participation in politics today, after the 
2016 presidential election?” has to do with evangelicals’ 
tendency to exclude other groups. Whereas at one time 
evangelicals excluded African Americans, Catholics, and 
other groups, today the focus has shifted decisively toward 
Muslims. The dominant assumption among evangelicals is 
that Muslims cannot participate well in political life, largely 
because of the concepts such as jihad and sharia law. At 
a campaign rally in New Hampshire, a white male constit-
uent had this comment and question for Donald Trump: 
“We have a problem in this country. It’s called Muslims. 
You know our current president is one. You know he’s 
not even an American…We have training camps growing 
where they want to kill us. That’s my question: When can 
we get rid of them?” (Schleifer). Trump didn’t denounce 
this terrifying question. He interjected with a comment 
that made light of this constituent’s bigotry, and then he 
responded by saying, simply, that he would be “looking at a 
lot of different things.” In addition, he issued this infamous 
statement December 7, 2015: “Donald J. Trump is calling 
for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States until our country’s representatives can figure 
out what the hell is going on” (Horton). This statement 
came five days after the San Bernadino shooting, and 
Trump exploited the fear and ignorance of a huge portion 
of the American electorate, which was ready to castigate 
an entire religion as un-American and anti-democratic. 
Ben Carson has made similarly misguided claims. He 
argued insistently against allowing a Muslim to become 
president because he, Carson, believes that sharia law is 
incompatible with the United States Constitution. Carson 
believes that in order for a Muslim to become president 
of the United States, he or she would “have to reject the 
tenets of Islam.” He elaborated on this belief by saying, “I 
would have problems with somebody who embraced all 
“In the era of Trump, evangelicals are voting 
by inertia, without a clear and coherent 
story about why they engage in politics the 
way they do.”
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the doctrines associated with Islam…If they are not willing 
to reject sharia and all the portions of it that are talked 
about in the Quran—if they are not willing to reject that, 
and subject that to American values and the Constitution, 
then of course, I would” (Bradner). Carson’s and Trump’s 
beliefs about the relationship between Islam, sharia, and 
the United States Constitution are ignorant. They also 
clearly violate the spirit and (maybe the letter) of the 
First Amendment, which says in part, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and Article VI of the 
Constitution, which prohibits tests of religion as a prereq-
uisite for serving in public office. 
These beliefs are not, however, at odds with one of the 
basic political impulses of American evangelicalism. If the 
story grounding evangelical politics has fallen apart, the 
tendency to exclude has not. The assumption that Muslims 
cannot be good participants in American democracy 
is consistent with evangelical views from earlier eras 
about black people, Catholics, and other groups. It is an 
intolerant and factually ill-informed assumption, but it 
is consistent with evangelicals’ engagement of politics. 
So what is the state of religion in Trump’s America? With 
regard to evangelicals and Muslims, it is, in part, this: 
evangelicals have lost the coherent narrative informing 
their politics but have maintained their exclusive and 
intolerant impulses, while Muslims are subject to 
anti-democratic forms of intolerance.
Muslims are not the only people who face intense 
persecution in Trump’s America. Black, Latinx, and 
LGBTQ+ people do, too. I offer this story about evangeli-
calism and Islam in America as a way of engaging issues 
of power and oppression at a moment of crisis in United 
States history. Scholars who work on similar issues 
have the power—and thus the responsibility—to tell such 
stories in ways that restrain the powerful and empower 
the restrained. In Trump’s America, telling these stories 
well means being both scholarly and politically active. If 
our appeals to objectivity lead us away from this task, we 
abandon our Muslim, Black, Latinx, and LGBTQ+ students 
and neighbors at a critical moment, and we indulge in a 
luxury that they are not afforded.
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